Exploring the Interplay Between Science and Philosophy
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In the discourse surrounding the relationship between science and philosophy, a pressing question arises: should scientists refrain from delving into philosophical matters? This inquiry prompts us to consider the origins of our modern understanding of science.
Derek London, in his article “When Scientists Accidentally Become Philosophers,” presents us with thought-provoking questions regarding the perceived chasm between science and philosophy. He warns of the dangers posed by the increasingly indistinct lines separating scientific assertions from philosophical discourse. Recent media portrayals have indeed started to depict scientists as philosophers.
Consider Michio Kaku, a theoretical physicist who often makes statements that border on the philosophical, such as his claim that “We would know the mind of God.” Kaku is a prominent figure in the realm of popular science, known for discussing concepts like the “God equation”—a topic I confess to knowing little about.
While the significance of the “God equation” in scientific terms remains uncertain, it is clear that the media has effectively infused philosophical elements into scientific discussions, making it appear as if science can address the profound questions traditionally reserved for philosophy.
This crossover extends beyond metaphysical inquiries. Following the September 11 attacks, numerous public intellectuals emerged, vocally critiquing religious beliefs. Among these figures, the so-called “Four Horsemen” of new atheism—Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, and Christopher Hitchens—include two distinguished scientists.
Sam Harris, a philosopher and neuroscientist, posits that science has the potential to answer moral questions, further blurring the boundary between science and moral philosophy. In his work, The Moral Landscape, he argues that if moral inquiries pertain to the well-being of conscious beings, then science, particularly neuroscience, can address these questions.
In summary, it appears that science is gradually encroaching upon the domain of philosophy.
London expresses concern over this encroachment, suggesting it can mislead individuals into thinking science is equipped to tackle questions beyond its scope. He echoes Kant’s sentiment that there are limitations to what we can classify as “scientific knowledge.”
I contend that the division between science and philosophy is socially constructed. Historically, the gap was virtually nonexistent; the separation between “facts” and “values” only emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries with the rise of Enlightenment thought and the establishment of the natural sciences. Although this distinction seems intuitive today, it was not always so clear-cut.
Consequently, scientists are justified in making philosophical assertions, drawing on their expertise and training. However, by doing so, they subject their scientific claims to philosophical scrutiny, rather than asserting dominance over the topic simply due to their scientific background.
Can Philosophy and Science Undermine Each Other?
One assertion from London that I find particularly contentious is his belief that philosophy and science can “corrupt” one another. My academic journey began in science before I transitioned to philosophy. The only instance of “corruption” I experienced was through reading Thomas Kuhn, who illuminated the non-linear nature of scientific advancement.
Kuhn maintains that science, by its very definition, is a more objective and empirical pursuit compared to philosophy. Hence, when scientists make philosophical assertions, they do not present them as “objective and empirical” claims. Conversely, philosophers who comment on scientific matters do not inherently offer “objective and empirical” statements either.
While it is possible to confuse philosophical claims with scientific assertions, I do not see this as a genuine “corruption” of their respective methodologies. Scientists are unlikely to drastically alter their methods based solely on philosophical conjectures from their colleagues.
If such a shift were so easily induced by public intellectuals venturing beyond their domains, then I fear the integrity of all fields of study would be at risk.
The Historical Emergence of Science
London correctly identifies that the distinction between science and philosophy is not straightforward. Historically, the concept of “science” as we understand it today did not exist. For instance, Isaac Newton’s seminal work was titled Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica—a title that reflects the historical intertwining of natural philosophy and mathematics.
During Newton’s era, the Age of Enlightenment marked the ascendancy of modern science. Prior to this period, the term “natural philosophy” was more prevalent, highlighting the blurred lines between these fields.
This ambiguity extends beyond etymology.
Today, we often associate science with notions of “empiricism” and “objectivity.” Many people believe scientific knowledge is founded on empirical evidence and rigorous experimentation, often adhering to a Popperian view that scientific claims must be falsifiable.
In contrast, philosophy is frequently perceived as a field that explores “hypothetical” and “subjective” inquiries, eschewing empirical experiments in favor of value-based studies.
This prevailing conception is encapsulated in the “fact-value” dichotomy, which historically emerged during the Enlightenment when Western Europe endeavored to secularize its knowledge systems.
One significant outcome of this movement was the rise of idealism, particularly through Immanuel Kant’s work in “transcendental idealism.” Kant aimed to delineate the limitations of human knowledge, dividing our experience into phenomena (the subjective) and noumena (the objective). He argued that we can never access the world in its purest form; our perceptions are always filtered through subjective lenses.
The secularization efforts led to an epistemological crisis: without a divine foundation, how can we secure the basis for our knowledge and experiences? Kant’s work epitomized this crisis. Amidst it, modern science emerged, seeking to bridge the gap between phenomena and noumena, largely championed by Francis Bacon’s advocacy for empirical inquiry and experimentation—what we now refer to as the “scientific method.”
However, this bridging was not fully realized.
Philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre contends that natural science fundamentally embodies an empiricist perspective.
Natural Science instructs us to prioritize certain experiences over others and only those when they conform to scientific scrutiny. It redraws the boundaries between perception and reality, creating new distinctions between appearance and truth, as well as illusion and reality. The meanings of ‘experiment’ and ‘experience’ diverge more sharply than they did in the 17th century. — MacIntyre, After Virtue
Rather than closing the gap between “phenomena” and “noumena,” modern science redefines these boundaries, objectifying some experiences while dismissing others as “subjective” and “unempirical.” MacIntyre illustrates this point:
The lenses of the telescope and the microscope are prioritized over the human eye; in measuring temperature, the effects of heat on alcohol or mercury take precedence over its effects on sunburned skin or parched throats.
In Kuhnian terms, modern science operates within a paradigm, while philosophy does not. The establishment of an objective and empirical study of science emerged through a sociological process. Scientific institutions must assert what constitutes “objective” and “empirical” in order to differentiate “fact” from “value” and legitimate science from pseudoscience.
Thus, the notion that science embodies objectivity and empiricism could not exist without an authoritative institution. Fortunately, this foundation was laid during the 18th century amidst a secularizing movement in Europe. Today, we regard science as the epitome of facts, objectivity, and empiricism, despite the historical reality that many did not.
It is with the establishment of scientific authority that the distinction between facts and values came into existence. Historically, science was part of philosophy, only to later separate itself as it found its own authority. The natural sciences then subdivided into disciplines such as Biology, Chemistry, and Physics, each carving out its own niche of authority.
All Scientists Are Philosophers
Before the advent of the facts-value distinction, all scientists were essentially philosophers (or heretics). In contemporary discourse, we often distinguish between scientists and philosophers primarily for institutional purposes. This classification allows us to identify authorities within various fields of study, which holds significant societal implications. For instance, one would not want an electrical engineer to diagnose an illness, nor a heart surgeon to perform automotive repairs.
However, adhering too rigidly to institutional boundaries can stifle innovative thinking. While it is true that a philosopher may not possess the expertise to navigate the complexities of general relativity, we should remain open to the possibility that some philosophers are also adept mathematicians.
Many groundbreaking ideas today emerge from interdisciplinary exploration. Moral psychology exemplifies a field where scientific inquiry intersects with moral philosophy, while AI and medical ethics illustrate how philosophical questions can arise in the context of medicine and technology. Given these interdisciplinary endeavors, we should be wary of dismissing the notion that science can tackle “big questions.”
While it is essential to critique the philosophical assertions made by scientists, this principle applies universally to all claims. Thus, although I maintain that all scientists possess a philosophical dimension, I also assert that not all scientists excel as philosophers.
I extend my gratitude to Derek London for inspiring this article and providing an opportunity to engage with his perspectives. For further reading, check out his article here:
When Scientists Accidentally Become Philosophers
‘Not all statements of scientists are statements of science.’
dereklondon.medium.com
Through this discourse, I aim to encourage readers to adopt a broader understanding of the interplay between science and philosophy and to be cautious of narrow ideologies. Interestingly, throughout much of Chinese history, the concepts of “science” and “philosophy” as we know them today were absent, further highlighting the social constructedness of the facts-value and science-philosophy dichotomy.
Why China Never Had Science, Religion, Or Philosophy?
And maybe it still doesn’t.
medium.com