Exploring the Morality of Holding a Flat Earth Belief

Is it possible to genuinely believe something that seems absurd, like the idea that the Earth is flat? If someone were offered a substantial sum of money to genuinely embrace such a belief, would they be able to do so? Most likely, the answer is no. We might feign belief, but true conviction seems beyond our grasp, regardless of the incentives presented.

The ethics of belief raises a critical question: Are we morally obligated to hold certain beliefs? This inquiry is at the intersection of moral philosophy and the philosophy of religion. A fundamental tenet of ethics is that our obligations must be within our capacity to fulfill; if we are expected to do something, it must be something we can actually do.

Consider a scenario where you are on a bus that suddenly stops, causing you to unintentionally collide with another passenger. In this case, it would be unreasonable to assert that you "should not have done that" since the collision was beyond your control. Such distinctions between actions that happen to us and those we initiate are crucial in ethical discussions.

While we can typically observe actions, beliefs present a more complex challenge. Unlike actions, we cannot directly witness someone's true beliefs; we may only infer them based on observable behavior. For example, if a person quenches their thirst with water, we might deduce they believe water is refreshing. However, this connection is often problematic, as individuals frequently act against their own beliefs.

The Question of Obligations in Belief

At the core of this discussion lies a contentious issue: do we have moral obligations regarding what we believe? Some philosophers, like William Clifford, argue that we should only believe what is supported by sufficient evidence. His assertion that it is always wrong to hold beliefs based on inadequate evidence seems straightforward. However, if this were the case, then countless individuals, from flat Earth proponents to conspiracy theorists, would face moral scrutiny for their beliefs, despite the fact that having incorrect beliefs does not necessarily equate to engaging in immoral actions.

This brings to light the distinction between holding erroneous beliefs and committing morally wrong acts. If Clifford's assertion were accurate, it would imply that those who maintain false beliefs in the face of overwhelming evidence are morally equivalent to criminals, which is a troubling conclusion.

Moreover, the definition of "evidence" is itself a matter of contention, particularly in the philosophy of science. What is convincing evidence for one person may not be for another. For instance, many devout individuals view their sacred texts as substantial evidence of their beliefs, while skeptics may reject those texts as valid proof.

The Nature of Belief

Clifford's principle presupposes that belief operates like action, implying we can choose what we believe. This assumption is shared by various philosophers, including Soren Kierkegaard, who characterized belief as a free act of will, rather than a form of knowledge.

Modern thinkers like Engel and Pojman advocate for volitionalism, the idea that if one desires to believe something, they can do so, regardless of the evidence to the contrary. However, this perspective raises concerns. If I choose to believe in something outlandish, like the existence of Santa Claus, it opens the door to a slippery slope of arbitrary beliefs.

Nonetheless, proponents of volitionalism do not typically advocate for trivial beliefs; they are usually concerned with significant beliefs that shape communities and societal values. Therefore, while an individual believing in Santa may not warrant concern, a collective belief in such a figure could invite ethical examination.

This leads to an essential philosophical inquiry: Can individuals genuinely choose to believe in significant sociocultural ideas if they desire? My stance is that they cannot.

The Nature of Beliefs

If individuals do not have the capacity to choose their sincere beliefs, two important implications arise. First, beliefs may resemble those unintended collisions mentioned earlier—they are beyond our control and, thus, cannot be morally judged. This perspective helps to prevent conflating incorrect beliefs with other moral transgressions.

However, this does not imply that actions stemming from these beliefs are free from moral evaluation. For instance, if someone commits a heinous act due to their belief in a fictional deity, they can and should be held accountable for their actions.

Second, the assertion that beliefs cannot change based on evidence challenges the notion of acting on evidence. Our beliefs inform how we interpret evidence, leading to the idea of scientific holism. Individuals bring their pre-existing beliefs to the table when evaluating new information, which explains why conflicting interpretations can arise from the same set of observations.

The Possibility of Changing Beliefs

It is crucial to acknowledge that beliefs can and do change. People convert to different religions, abandon nihilism, and adapt their views through social interactions. While I maintain that individuals cannot directly choose their beliefs, they can choose how to live in accordance with those beliefs.

Thus, holding a belief in a flat Earth does not inherently make someone immoral, nor does believing in astrology equate to malevolence. Conversely, faith in a higher power does not guarantee virtuous behavior.

The Morality of Belief in a Flat Earth

The ethics of belief raises questions about whether ethical standards apply to our convictions. Is it inherently wrong to believe something that is demonstrably false? I contend that beliefs reside outside the realm of ethical scrutiny. Unlike actions, beliefs are not easily evaluated, and since "ought implies can," they cannot be subjected to moral assessment because we lack control over our beliefs.

Moreover, beliefs and actions are fundamentally different. It is unjust to equate flat Earth believers with criminals. A person can hold incorrect beliefs yet lead a life of integrity.

Finally, it is essential to differentiate between simply "wrong beliefs" and those that are "morally wrong." The former is a descriptive term, while the latter is normative. While I acknowledge the need to correct misconceptions, I argue against equating erroneous beliefs with serious moral violations such as theft or murder.